Suchergebnisse

Political parties rooted in a non-democratic system have become a significant element of party systems in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, where they have taken an active part in the transformation process. The paper assesses the significance of these types of groupings for the construction of a new democratic system by means of a comparison of four members of the Vysehrad Group. The ideological profiles of these parties and their position in the party arena are defined. Finally, an attempt is made to answer the question of how these groupings have adapted to the new democratic system, why some of them continue to play a crucial role in politics even today, while others are found somewhere on the outskirts of political life. The author's interests focus on the successors of those groupings that held full power before 1989: the Democratic Left Alliance in Poland, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia in the Czech Republic, the Party of the Democratic Left in Slovakia, and the Hungarian Socialist Party. The example of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia is of particular interest here as this is the only party that has not fundamentally changed its ideological profile and continues in isolation from other Czech groupings. At the same time, for twenty years, this same party has come third in the national elections, and even second in the European elections. ; Political parties rooted in a non-democratic system have become a significant element of party systems in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, where they have taken an active part in the transformation process. The paper assesses the significance of these types of groupings for the construction of a new democratic system by means of a comparison of four members of the Vysehrad Group. The ideological profiles of these parties and their position in the party arena are defined. Finally, an attempt is made to answer the question of how these groupings have adapted to the new democratic system, why some of them continue to play a crucial role in politics even today, while others are found somewhere on the outskirts of political life. The author's interests focus on the successors of those groupings that held full power before 1989: the Democratic Left Alliance in Poland, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia in the Czech Republic, the Party of the Democratic Left in Slovakia, and the Hungarian Socialist Party. The example of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia is of particular interest here as this is the only party that has not fundamentally changed its ideological profile and continues in isolation from other Czech groupings. At the same time, for twenty years, this same party has come third in the national elections, and even second in the European elections.

Political parties rooted in a non-democratic system have become a significant element of party systems in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, where they have taken an active part in the transformation process. The paper assesses the significance of these types of groupings for the construction of a new democratic system by means of a comparison of four members of the Vysehrad Group. The ideological profiles of these parties and their position in the party arena are defined. Finally, an attempt is made to answer the question of how these groupings have adapted to the new democratic system, why some of them continue to play a crucial role in politics even today, while others are found somewhere on the outskirts of political life. The author's interests focus on the successors of those groupings that held full power before 1989: the Democratic Left Alliance in Poland, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia in the Czech Republic, the Party of the Democratic Left in Slovakia, and the Hungarian Socialist Party. The example of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia is of particular interest here as this is the only party that has not fundamentally changed its ideological profile and continues in isolation from other Czech groupings. At the same time, for twenty years, this same party has come third in the national elections, and even second in the European elections.

In the Author's opinion, if the development of civic society is to be measured in terms of participation in political life and involvement in non-government organizations East Germans seem to have adapted to the new reality better than Poles. However, if we take into consideration the potential of both nations Poles still stand a chance to build an efficient, and, first of all, their own, modern society. The advantage of having retained their own country, although so often criticized by Poles, may turn out to be fundamental. East Germans could not enjoy this privilege. ; In the Author's opinion, if the development of civic society is to be measured in terms of participation in political life and involvement in non-government organizations East Germans seem to have adapted to the new reality better than Poles. However, if we take into consideration the potential of both nations Poles still stand a chance to build an efficient, and, first of all, their own, modern society. The advantage of having retained their own country, although so often criticized by Poles, may turn out to be fundamental. East Germans could not enjoy this privilege.

Reprivatization is one of the problems Polish politicians have failed to solve for 15 years. They developed nearly a score of drafts of reprivatization acts, none of which has been implemented. Election campaigns and government changes most frequently obstructed them. This happened to the draft developed by Hanna Suchocka's government, later withheld by the next government of Waldemar Pawlak and the coalition of SLD-PSL (Democratic Left Alliance – Polish People's Party). The coalition AWS-UW (Solidarity Election Action – Freedom Union) was very likely to launch reprivatization. Although it had the required majority in the Parliament, the political disputes inside the Solidarity Election Action prevented reprivatization. For the Solidarity Election Action with Marian Krzaklewski, general endowment was to ensure the victory to the party and himself in the next parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. As a result of the internal disputes, the reprivatization act was vetoed by President Kwaśniewski and the elections marked the AWS's collapse. After Poland's accession to the European Union former property owners have increasingly been demanding to restore the seized property, yet the issue does not seem likely to be solved soon and the very idea of reprivatization dissolves in political and ideological controversies. ; Reprivatization is one of the problems Polish politicians have failed to solve for 15 years. They developed nearly a score of drafts of reprivatization acts, none of which has been implemented. Election campaigns and government changes most frequently obstructed them. This happened to the draft developed by Hanna Suchocka's government, later withheld by the next government of Waldemar Pawlak and the coalition of SLD-PSL (Democratic Left Alliance – Polish People's Party). The coalition AWS-UW (Solidarity Election Action – Freedom Union) was very likely to launch reprivatization. Although it had the required majority in the Parliament, the political disputes inside the Solidarity Election Action prevented reprivatization. For the Solidarity Election Action with Marian Krzaklewski, general endowment was to ensure the victory to the party and himself in the next parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. As a result of the internal disputes, the reprivatization act was vetoed by President Kwaśniewski and the elections marked the AWS's collapse. After Poland's accession to the European Union former property owners have increasingly been demanding to restore the seized property, yet the issue does not seem likely to be solved soon and the very idea of reprivatization dissolves in political and ideological controversies.

Reprivatization is one of the problems Polish politicians have failed to solve for 15 years. They developed nearly a score of drafts of reprivatization acts, none of which has been implemented. Election campaigns and government changes most frequently obstructed them. This happened to the draft developed by Hanna Suchocka's government, later withheld by the next government of Waldemar Pawlak and the coalition of SLD-PSL (Democratic Left Alliance – Polish People's Party). The coalition AWS-UW (Solidarity Election Action – Freedom Union) was very likely to launch reprivatization. Although it had the required majority in the Parliament, the political disputes inside the Solidarity Election Action prevented reprivatization. For the Solidarity Election Action with Marian Krzaklewski, general endowment was to ensure the victory to the party and himself in the next parliamentary and presidential elections respectively. As a result of the internal disputes, the reprivatization act was vetoed by President Kwaśniewski and the elections marked the AWS's collapse. After Poland's accession to the European Union former property owners have increasingly been demanding to restore the seized property, yet the issue does not seem likely to be solved soon and the very idea of reprivatization dissolves in political and ideological controversies.

W 2010 r. na Węgrzech przejęła władzę partia V. Orbana – FIDESZ. Dzięki wysokiej wygranej w wyborach parlamentarnych (niemal 53% głosów, co przełożyło się na 263 mandaty, czyli o 5 więcej niż wynosi konstytucyjna większość) możliwe stało się wprowadzenie głębokich zmian (w tym uchwalenie nowej konstytucji). W opinii wielu organizacji stojących na straży demokracji, a także Unii Europejskiej, zagrażają one fundamentom systemu demokratycznego w tym kraju. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie rozwoju demokracji na Węgrzech po 1989 r., a przede wszystkim ocena zmian zachodzących w tym kraju po 2010 r. W oparciu o dostępne wskaźniki jakości demokracji (Freedom House oraz The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy), podjęta zostanie także próba zweryfikowania tezy Janosa Kornaia, iż "Od lat 1989–1990 do wiosny 2010 r. na Węgrzech była demokracja. Już jej nie ma – formą rządów stała się autokracja" (Kornai, 2011). W artykule skonfrontowano również zarzuty stawiane węgierskim reformom przez społeczność międzynarodową z tym, co na ich temat mają do powiedzenia twórcy tychże reform. ; In 2010 the Fidesz party of V. Orban took power. Owing to the considerable majority they won in the parliamentary elections (nearly 53% of the votes, which translated into 263 mandates, five more than required for a constitutional majority) it was possible to implement profound changes (including a new constitution). In the opinion of numerous organizations guarding democracy and of the European Union, these changes pose a threat to the foundations of democracy in Hungary. The objective of this paper is to present the development of democracy in Hungary after 1989, and first and foremost to assess the changes that have taken place there after 2010. On the basis of accessible indices of the quality of democracy (Freedom House and The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy), the paper also attempts to verify the statement by Janos Kornai who said that "from 1989–1990 to the spring of 2010 Hungary was democratic. Now democracy is gone – autocracy has become the form of governance" (Kornai, 2011). The paper also counterpoints the accusations of Hungarian reforms, voiced by international community, with the opinions of the authors of these reforms.